

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STOCKH 02113 01 OF 02 301235Z

51

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NEA-06 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05

CIAE-00 DODE-00 SAM-01 SAB-01 EURE-00 PM-03 SP-02

EA-06 IO-03 /055 W

----- 107047

P R 301130Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4569

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 2113

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, SW, IS, XF, UR

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON VISIT TO ISRAEL

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 2537 (B) STOCKHOLM 1735

1. SUMMARY. I HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSSON FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM VISIT TO ISRAEL. ANDERSSON CHARACTERIZED ISRAELI MOOD AS "INFLEXIBLE" AND SAID ISRAELIS SEEM CONFIDENT TIME IS WORKING ON THEIR SIDE. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT IN HIS VISIT TO CAIRO IN FEBRUARY, SADAT AND FAHMY HAD SEEMED CONSIDERABLY MORE FLEXIBLE THAN RABIN AND ALLON DO NOW. ANDERSSON HAD BEEN INFORMED BY SOCIALIST CONTACTS IN ISRAEL ABOUT VISIT IN TEL AVIV A WEEK  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STOCKH 02113 01 OF 02 301235Z

EARLIER OF TWO SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS. ALTHOUGH NO SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS WERE ACHIEVED FROM SOVIET VISIT, SWEDES BELIEVE MERE FACT OF CONTACT WAS IMPORTANT. IN CONCLUSION, ANDERSSON SAID HE AND OTHER SWEDISH OFFICIALS HAD RETURNED

FROM TEL AVIV "VERY PESSIMISTIC" ABOUT OUTLOOK FOR PEACE  
IN MIDEAST. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING MY CALL APRIL 29 ON FOREIGN MINISTER  
ANDERSSON TO RAISE THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE  
REFUGEES (SEPTTEL), WE ALSO DISCUSSED AT LENGTH ANDERSSON'S  
VISIT TO ISRAEL APRIL 21 - 23. ANDERSSON SAID ONE WORD  
DESCRIBES THE ATMOSPHERE AS HE FOUND IT IN TEL AVIV:  
"INFLEXIBILITY." HE SAID HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE  
HARDNESS OF THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE AND HOW SMALL A  
MARGIN THERE SEEMED TO BE FOR "GIVE" ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. HE  
SAID ANDERS THUNBORG, WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM, FOUND THE  
ISRAELI POSITION MUCH TOUGHER THAN ON HIS PREVIOUS VISIT TO  
ISRAEL SIX WEEKS EARLIER.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE ASKED THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS  
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER JULY 24 WHEN THE TWO UN MANDATES  
EXPIRED TO WHICH THE ISRAELIS REPLIED THAT WHILE THEY WOULD  
LIKE TO KEEP UN TROOPS ON THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN FRONTS,  
IF EGYPT AND SYRIA WANT THEM TO LEAVE, "THAT'S UP TO THEM."  
FURTHERMORE, ANDERSSON CONTINUED, THE ISRAELIS DON'T  
"BELIEVE IN" THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, BUT WILL ATTEND. HE SAID  
RABIN TOLD THEM THAT THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT IN THE  
LONG RUN THE ARABS WILL SPLIT AND THE WESTERN WORLD WILL  
BECOME LESS DEPENDENT UPON ARAB OIL. THE ISRAELIS SEEM  
CONFIDENT OF CONTINUED US SUPPORT AND BELIEVE THEY CAN  
WITHSTAND THE PRESSURE FROM EGYPT AND SYRIA. WHEN ADERSSSON  
EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS INFLEXIBLE ATTITUDE COULD LEAD  
TO A NEW WAR, THE ISRAELIS COUNTERED THAT THEY ARE WILLING  
TO SIT DOWN AND TALK WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA AT ANY TIME. THE ONLY  
ISRAELI LEADER WHO SHOWED ANY FLEXIBILITY, ANDERSSON  
CONTINUED, WAS FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON.

4. ANDERSSON SAID HIS VISIT IMPRESSED UPON HIM THE FACT THAT  
ISRAEL IS RULED BY "FORMER GENERALS, ALL OF WHOM HAVE WON  
A WAR, AND NONE OF WHOM IS PREPARED TO LOSE A WAR AS DAYAN  
ALMOST DID." WHEN I ASKED IF THEY SEEMED CONFIDENT THEY  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STOCKH 02113 01 OF 02 301235Z

WOULD WIN ANY NEW CONFLICT, ANDERSSON REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY,  
BUT ADDED THAT HE WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THIS WAS A POSTURE  
TAKEN TO IMPRESS VISITORS OR TRUE CONVICTION. I ASKED IF  
THE SWEDES HAD TALKED TO THE ISRAELI LEADERS "AS ONE  
SOCIALIST TO ANOTHER." THE DIRECTOR OF MFA POLITICAL AFFAIRS,  
LEIFLANT, WHO WAS PRESENT AND WHO HAD ALSO ACCOMPANIED THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER, REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD INDEED STRESSED  
THIS SOCIALIST CONNECTION.

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONTINUED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER  
ALLON HAD JUST RETURNED FROM HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND  
HAD JOINED THE TALKS. I ASKED ANDERSSON IF ALLON OR THE  
OTHER ISRAELIS HAD DISCUSSED THE US. ANDERSSON REPLIED

THAT THEY HAD NOT, DESPITE HIS OWN EFFORTS TO RAISE THIS ISSUE. HE ADDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE EXTREMELY CAREFUL ON THIS POINT, SINCE THEY HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH US PARTIES. ACCORDING TO ANDERSSON (AND IN CONTRAST TO COMMENTS OF SWEDISH AMBASSADR IN TEL AVIV, REF A), ALLON EXPRESSED "DEEP SATISFACTION" WITH HIS TALKS WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER. WHEN I QUESTIONED ANDERSSON ON THIS, HE ADDED THAT ALLON DID NOT HIDE THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE POSITION OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, BUT ALLON HAD ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS NO "IRRITATION" ON THE US SIDE.

6. ANDERSSON SAID THAT COMPARING HIS VISITS TO BOTH CAIRO AND TEL AVIV, HE COULD SAY WITHOUT HESITATION THAT SADAT AND FAHMY HAD BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS THAN HAD RABIN AND ALLON. HE SAID THE SWEDES BELIEVE THAT BOTH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND A MAJORITY OF THE KNESSET RELY MORE ON MILITARY STRENGTH AND BUFFER ZONES THAN ON AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL SOLUTION. IN VIEW OF THIS, THE GOS COULD

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STOCKH 02113 02 OF 02 301256Z

51

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 NEA-06 ISO-00 SS-14 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05

CIAE-00 DODE-00 SAM-01 SAB-01 EURE-00 PM-03 SP-02

EA-06 IO-03 /055 W

----- 107249

P R 301130Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4570

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 2113

LIMDIS

WELL UNDERSTAND WHY SECRETARY KISSINGER FOUND IT SO DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDEAST. AS THE SWEDES SEE IT, THE "TWO STRONG GENERALS" (DAYAN AND ALLON) HAVE LONG BEEN AT ODDS, BUT SINCE THE OCTOBER

WAR THE PRESTIGE OF DAYAN HAS DWINDLED WHILE ALLON'S HAS GROWN. BUT DAYAN IS STILL STRONG ENOUGH TO PREVENT ALLON FROM GETTING TOTAL POWER, WITH THE RESULT THAT A NON-POLITICIAN, RABIN, ASSUMED THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP WHEN GOLDA MEIR STEPPED DOWN. ANDERSSON SAID THAT IT APPEARED THAT ALLON HAD GAINED FURTHER PRESTIGE BY RESISTING SECRETARY KISSINGER'S EFFORTS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

7. I COMMENTED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT RPT NOT BRING BACK A "ROSY PICTURE" FROM ISRAEL. ANDERSSON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SINCE HIS VISIT HE IS NOW "VERY CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STOCKH 02113 02 OF 02 301256Z

PESSIMISTIC" ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THE MIDEAST. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE GOS HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE PLO THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN ADAMANT THAT THE PLO COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE GENEVA TALKS, ALTHOUGH THEY CONCEDED THAT IF IT WERE PART OF THE SYRIAN DELEGATION OR THE ARAB LEAGUE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

8. I ASKED ANDERSSON IF THE SWEDES HAD RAISED ANY QUESTION ABOUT THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDEAST. ANDERSSON REPLIED THAT HE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THIS POINT, AND HAD ASKED HIS VARIOUS SOCIALIST FRIENDS IN ISRAEL IF THERE WERE ANY SECRET CONTACTS GOING ON WITH THE SOVIETS. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT TWO MEMBERS OF THE CPSU "STAFF" HAD BEEN IN JERUSALEM ONLY A WEEK BEFORE HIS OWN VISIT, AND WHEN HE ASKED RABIN AND ALLON WHO THEY WERE, BOTH REFUSED TO COMMENT. HE SAID HIS OWN CONTACTS (UNIDENTIFIED) HAD SAID NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE HAD EMERGED FROM THE SOVIET VISIT, BUT IT WAS FELT THAT JUST THE MERE FACT OF CONTACT WAS IMPORTANT. HE SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE VISIT WAS ON THE SOVIET INITIATIVE, ADDING THAT HE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN. ANDERSSON SAID HE HAD REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S SPEECH IN MOSCOW ON ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS, BUT THAT ALLON HAD DISMISSED THE SPEECH AS INSIGNIFICANT, EVEN THOUGH ANDERSSON HAD POINTED OUT THAT IT SEEMED DIRECTED AGAINST PLO LEADER ARAFAT.

9. CONTINUING, ANDERSSON SAID THE MAIN ISRAELI DRIVE IS FOR SECURITY. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED EITHER THROUGH MILITARY EXPANSION, WHICH ULTIMATELY MEANS RENEWED WAR, OR THROUGH EFFORTS TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION. IN THE SWEDISH VIEW, ONLY THROUGH A US-SOVIET GUARANTEE CAN ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS BE MET, AND ANDERSSON ASKED ME WHETHER THE USG COULD SEEK THIS. I REPLIED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD MADE CLEAR THAT ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT WILL REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE USSR. ANDERSSON COMMENTED THAT ISRAELIS HAD TOLD THEM THAT AT THE TIME OF THE SUEZ CRISIS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAD GIVEN WRITTEN GUARANTEES TO TEL AVIV THAT IF WAR BROKE OUT THE US WOULD ASSIST ISRAEL BY BLOCKADING THE

TIRAN STRAITS. TEN YEARS LATER, THE ISRAELIS ASSERTED,  
WHEN THE 1967 WAR BROKE OUT, THIS GUARANTEE WAS "JUST A  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STOCKH 02113 02 OF 02 301256Z

SCRAP OF PAPER."

10. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT, IN CONTRAST TO THE  
ISRAELI VIEW THAT IME IS ON THEIR SIDE, THE SWEDES  
BELIEVE THAT SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD WILL  
CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY AND THAT WORLD OPINION MAY  
INCREASINGLY TURN AGAINST ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY IF IT  
REFUSES TO RETURN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE SWEDES  
THINK THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT RPT NOT WANT A NEW WAR  
OR ISRAEL TO DISAPPEAR, AND THAT THE DIFFICULTIES  
BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE ARABS SEEMS TO BE  
CONSIDERABLE.

11. I COMMENTED THAT BECAUSE OF OUR WISH TO AVOID A  
SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDEAST, WE HAVE LONG  
WORKED FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE AREA. THE  
DANGERS OF SUCH A CONFRONTATION SURFACED DURING THE  
YOM KIPPER WAR, AND THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN  
ENDEAVORING TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD AVOID  
THE REPETITION OF SUCH A CONFRONTATION. I ADDED THAT  
WE ALSO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT A WAR IN THE MIDEAST.

12. AS WE PARTED, THE FOREIGN MINISTER REITERATED THAT  
HE HAD RETURNED FROM TEL AVIV "VERY PESSIMISTIC" ABOUT  
THE OUTLOOK FOR A MIDEAST PEACE SETTLEMENT.  
STRAUSZ-HUPE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PERSONAL OPINION, MINISTERIAL VISITS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STOCKH02113  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750151-0835  
**From:** STOCKHOLM  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197504102/baaaadge.tel  
**Line Count:** 251  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 09 MAY 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <09 MAY 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <12 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, OVIP, SW, IS, XF, UR, (ANDERSSON, SVEN)  
**To:** STATE INFO AMMAN  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
COPENHAGEN  
DAMASCUS  
HELSINKI

MOSCOW  
OSLO  
REYKJAVIK  
TEL AVIV

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006